Update, wenn auch unvollständig (insbesondere die vielen einzelnen Anschläge im letzten halben Jahr sind nicht dokumentiert).
SIGAR – Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, September 2017, Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan; abzurufen unter:
“A fully capable Afghan National Defense and Security Force (ANDSF) that is able to secure Afghanistan from internal and external threats and prevent the re-establishment of terrorist safe havens is a U.S. national security objective. Despite U.S. government expenditures of more than $70 billion in security sector assistance to design, train, advise, assist, and equip the ANDSF since 2002, the Afghan security forces are not yet capable of securing their own nation. …. …”
Der Hohe Flüchtlingskommissar der Vereinten Nationen (UNHCR), 03.02.2017, Tough choices for Afghan refugees returning home after years in exile, abzurufen unter:
„… UNHCR does not promote refugee returns to Afghanistan given the enduring conflict in different parts of the country and its limited absorption capacity. However, it is our clear mandate to help those who decide to return. … UNHCR shares concerns that the pace of returns in 2016 far outstripped Afghanistan’s capacity to help people reintegrate after years – in most cases decades – of refuge in Pakistan. Many of refugees returned to uncertain futures in Afghanistan. Returning refugees have to rebuild their lives amidst increasing levels of internal displacement, insecurity and levels of violence not seen since the fall of the Taliban in 2002. ..”